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Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing 
countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. 
Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior 
studies reveal mixed, somewhere conflicting and ambiguous, and somewhere no relationship 
between governance structure and performance. This study empirically investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed 
banking companies in Bangladesh by using two multiple regression models. The study reveals 
that a good number of companies do not comply with the regulatory requirements indicating 
remarkable shortfall in corporate governance practice. The companies are run by the 
professional managers having no duality and no ownership interest for which they are 
compensated by high remuneration to curb agency conflict. Apart from some inconsistent 
relationship between some corporate variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not 
appear to have significant relationship with financial performances. The findings reveal an 
insignificant negative impact or somewhere no impact of independent directors and non-
independent non-executive directors on the level of performance that strongly support the 
concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust and earn returns for the owners as 
claimed by stewardship theory. The study provides support for the view that while much 
emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of 
stakeholders; corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate 
conformance, cannot make a company successful. Companies need to balance corporate 
governance mechanisms with performance by adopting strategic decision and risk 
management with the efficient utilization of the organization’s resources. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has become increasingly important for corporations in developed and 
developing countries around the world just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in 
a number of countries. Corporate governance shortcomings are identified as significant in 
explaining the financial scandals and corporate collapses. It is observed that weak corporate 
governance causes lack of monitoring and transparency, inefficiency in companies’ overall 
activities and ultimately results in poor corporate performance and disgusts stakeholders. 
Although, corporate governance encompasses the whole gamut of administration with its 
integrity, efficiency, growth and profitability, its successfulness lies in the appropriate 
combination of resources with the governance structure. In this perspective, it is hard to belief 
that only some rules and regulations about governance structure can wave the rim of success 
without regard to psycho-physiological aspects combined with the prevailing socio-political-
cultural environment of a group of people working in the entities. Rather rules and regulations 
are required for conformance and accountability to the stakeholders and thus prevent 
malpractices and frauds to a greater extent, not fully. If corporate governance is a structure, 
dimension and an arrangement of human and nonhuman factors employed in an organization, 
then its achievement towards desired goals is the product of the successful and effective 
combination of economic, social and political traits of factors under the legal framework. 
Finding this combination is not an easy task. For this reason, several schools of thought and 
theories are seen to be used to address the problems, to explain situations and success.  
 
In Bangladesh, the contribution of industrial sectors is very poor, only about 16 percent to 
GDP, which can be seen as too low to eradicate the curse of abject poverty and to sustain 
growth. What is needed for industrialization is an efficient capital market. To improve the 
situation, different reform programs including a corporate governance reform have been 
undertaken in Bangladesh over the last few years. As the dominant financier for industrial and 
commercial activities, banks can play a vital role in Bangladesh’s economy and the corporate 
governance of banks could have been a burning issue in the discussions, but they have been 
almost ignored. Banks are not only the key intermediaries between lenders and borrowers, but 
also providers of financial information on the economy. The reports by the Banking Reform 
Commission (1999) and BEI (2003) raised serious concerns on the banking sector and 
criticized the quality of governance. Many of the problems have been attributed to the lack of 
sound corporate governance among the banks. 
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Much of the large body of empirical studies devoted to corporate governance have emerged 
over the last decade dealing with the issue from various angles and with varied degrees of 
emphasis, but always in the context of advanced countries. Some of them are related to 
developing countries. Most of them are aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of corporate 
governance to the ultimate objective of a corporation – value maximization. One commented 
‘a sound corporate governance structure provides useful information to investors and creditors 
to reduce information asymmetry that also helps the company to improve operations’ (Chiang, 
2005). In contrast, some studies have revealed mixed results about the relationship between 
governance structure and performance. Gregory and Simms (1999) suggest that effective 
corporate governance helps in increasing the responsiveness of firms to social needs and 
expectations and in improving the long-term performance of firms. Fahy et al. (2005), 
separated corporate performance (business governance) dimensions out from corporate 
conformance (corporate governance) dimensions, commenting that  
[c]orporate governance, or its apparent failure, has received a lot of attention in recent years with 
market meltdown and high profile scandals. Often regarded as a mandatory box-ticking exercise, 
corporate governance has rarely been counted as an activity that can create sustainable shareholders 
value. The performance dimension is concerned with developing and deploying effective strategic 
management processes to ensure that the firm creates value for shareholders. 
 
The PAIB Committee (2004) opined that  
[c]onformance (corporate governance) covers issues such as board structures and roles and executive 
remuneration. [...] Codes and/or standards can generally address this dimension with compliance being 
subject to assurance. The performance dimension focuses on strategy and value creation. The focus is 
on helping the board to: make strategic decisions; understand its appetite for risk and its key drivers of 
performance, and; identify its key points of decision making. This dimension does not lend itself easily 
to a regime of standards and audit. Instead, it is desirable to develop a range of best practice tools and 
techniques that can be applied intelligently within different types of organisation. 
 
This divergent situation paves the way to new research in the same context.  
In addition, according to Haniffa – Hudaib (2006),  
[e]very nation has its own national character as well as social and economic priorities and as such, what 
is desirable in one country may not be so in another. Likewise, every corporation has its own unique 
history, culture and business goals. Hence, efforts to reform corporate governance should take into 
account all of these factors.  
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In the case of Bangladesh, the social, political, and legal environment is not the same as in 
other countries and the journey of corporate governance has started very recently. Moreover, 
there has been only a handful of studies done on the issue dealing with non-financial sectors 
in developing countries like Bangladesh, but few of which are related to corporate governance 
in the banking sector. But the corporate governance in the banking sector has unique 
behaviour due to two special characteristics of banks. One is greater opacity in acquiring 
information about bank behaviour and another one is greater government regulation in 
monitoring bank activities that make many traditional mechanisms applicable for non-
financial sectors weaken. These suggest special separate consideration in the analysis of 
corporate governance apart from non-financial sectors as to how these newly devised legal, 
regulatory and supervisory polices influence the bank governance mechanisms and its 
objectives. This is the broad perspective that the study finally addresses. Now, in the above 
context, the pertinent question is: do the prevailing corporate governance mechanisms of 
banking companies in Bangladesh have any relationship with the companies’ performance? 
The study intends to search for the answer to this basic question by empirically examining the 
relationship between the two variables. 
 
With this end in view, this section covers the background and the problem statement of the 
study. The rest of the sections are organized as follows: the next section briefly depicts the 
corporate governance framework and corporate performance. Section 3 discusses briefly the 
corporate governance in the banking sector of Bangladesh. Section 4 reviews the relevant 
literature on governance mechanisms and their relationship with performance along with 
presenting the testable hypotheses. Section 5 presents the methodology of the research, and 
the models and variables used in the study. Section 6 deals with analysis of data comprising 
of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, results of regression analysis, and comparison 
with other studies. The study ends with section 7 which summarizes the findings, including 
limitations and avenues for further study, and finally draws conclusions.  
 
2. Corporate Governance Structure and Corporate Performance 
The corporate governance structure of a company comes into operations with the control 
forces through its internal and external mechanisms. Two broad categories of mechanisms are 
board structural mechanisms and ownership structural mechanisms. Generally, board 
mechanisms are utilised to monitor the activities of top managers. The board is entrusted with 
the responsibility of policy finalization and approval, and for making sure that the top 
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managers are pursuing polices consistent with the shareholders’ interests in a way that will 
ensure maximization of shareholder value in the company. Ownership structure is the final 
type of monitoring mechanism that the firm can implement to increase the incentive for board 
members to monitor firm managers. With their increasing shares of firm ownership, board 
members will have a personal wealth incentive to monitor managers, in addition to their 
fiduciary responsibility as members of the board of directors (Coles et al. 2001).  
 
Figure 1. Schematic Corporate Governance Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors 
 
The information disclosure mechanism works as an important indicator of corporate 
governance quality. It helps stakeholders understand the company’s governance practices and 
thus, minimise the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Debt financing is another 
internal governance mechanism whereby increased debt reduces free cash flow and so limits 
managerial discretion (Jensen 1986). If the company’s internal mechanisms fail, the market 
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for corporate control acts as a disciplining mechanism of last resort (Jensen 1986). The 
‘Schematic Corporate Governance Framework’ in Figure 1 depicts the mixture of controlling 
mechanisms and governance structures along with the controlling forces and resources. From 
these, a company selects configurations for formulation of policy and strategy, which’s 
implementation must be consistent with the socio-cultural and political environment. 
 
A company’s operations and successfulness are integrally connected. Studies show that the 
concept of a company’s performance is multidimensional. But the fact is that the company’s 
investors, shareholders and some stakeholders find its success in the financial performance. 
Financial performance refers to a ‘firm’s ability to generate new resources from day to day 
operations over a given period of time’ (ASB 2000). The financial performance measures can 
be divided into two major types: (1) accounting-based measures, and (2) market-based 
measures. Whatever may be the basis of measurement, profitability is the only way to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth in a company. And a sound system of corporate governance is 
believed to lead to increased returns to the company’s shareholders.  
 
3. Corporate Governance in Bangladesh 
The concept of corporate governance is relatively new in Bangladesh. The current legal 
framework in respect to corporate governance in Bangladesh includes: the Companies Act of 
1994, the Securities and Exchange Rules of 1987, the Banking Companies Act of 1991. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has promulgated different orders and 
notifications from time to time to ensure good corporate governance practice in the listed 
public limited companies. On the 9th January and the 20th February 2006, the SEC has issued 
orders for complying with a number of governance codes. Keeping in mind the importance of 
the financial sector and its proper control and guidance, the Central Bank (Bangladesh Bank) 
was given autonomy in terms of it’s operations and monetary policy formulation and 
implementation in March 2003, bringing massive reforms in the banking as well as the 
financial sector. The central bank promulgated codes of corporate governance for banks 
focusing on different mechanisms of corporate governance in which responsibilities and 
authorities of the Chairman, CEO, board of directors have been redefined, the constitution of 
boards of directors, audit committees, and requirements for the appointment of bank directors 
have been restructured. The number of directors in a board has been reduced to 13 and one 
person can be a board member for only one bank.  
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4. Prior Studies and Testable Hypotheses 
A review of the literature on the relationship between corporate performance and corporate 
governance characteristics shows mixed results (Haniffa – Hudaib 2006). Every researcher 
gives strong arguments in favor of his/her findings referring preferred theories on the 
convenience that all theories are based on human behavior and activities that vary from one 
case to another and cannot be measured properly. They always try to demarcate human beings 
within an economic boundary without considering the nature of mind and uniqueness of 
human traits. To examine the relationship of performance, the mechanisms to be considered 
are board structure, board monitoring, committee structure, CEO incentive alignment devices, 
directors’ shareholdings, institutional shareholdings and debt financing.  
 
The board of directors is the top executive unit of a company and assigned with the 
responsibility of formulating policies and strategies and supervising operations of the 
company. In Bangladesh, law limits the minimum number of director to be at least 5 and 
maximum 13. Fixing the optimal number of board of directors is a dilemma. The proverb “too 
many cooks spoil the broth” may be true for cases with many directors and again decision-
making precision may be hampered because of being too few. Empirical evidence indicates 
that the size of the board does matter as it affects the extent of monitoring, controlling and 
decision making in a company (Monks – Minow 1995; Haniffa – Hudaib 2006). Small boards 
are said to help in alleviating the effort problem and in becoming more effective (Jensen 
1993), but when they grow too big, boards become more symbolic rather than being a part of 
the management process (Hermalin – Weisbach 2000). Yermack (1996) finds an inverse 
relationship between board size, profitability and Tobin’s Q. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find 
board size negatively associated with market performance and positively with accounting 
performance measures that indicate contradictory results of the board size, whereas 
Holthausen and Larcker (1993) find no association between the two variables. As the 
supervisory authorities of banks are of the opinion that decreasing the number of directors 
will result in better governance and better performance, it may be implicitly assumed that the 
increase of operating costs associated with the increased number of directors results in 
decreased financial performance. Given the notion, the first hypothesis is stated as follows:  
 
H1: There is a significant inverse relationship between board size and corporate 
performance. 
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Most regulatory efforts have concentrated on the issue of independence of the board. In an 
attempt to reduce the CEO’s influence over the board, many countries have introduced 
requirements that a minimum fraction of the board be composed of so-called ‘independent’ 
directors. The rationale behind these regulations is that if directors are not otherwise 
dependent on the CEO they are more likely to defend shareholders’ interests’ (Becht et al. 
2005). In Bangladesh, a notification of the SEC made it compulsory in 2006 that at least one-
tenth (minimum one) of the company’s board of directors should be an independent director 
in order to enhance core competencies considered relevant in the context of each company. 
Chiang (2005) argues that as the independent directors are more specialized to monitor the 
board than the inside directors, they reduce the concentrated power of the CEO, and help to 
prevent misuse of resources and enhance performance. But it is not difficult to find flaws in 
the logic. Independent directors are still dependent on the CEO for reappointment.  
 
To date, most research on boards and the impact of independent directors is empirical, and the 
findings concerning the effects of independent directors are mixed (Becht et al. 2005). 
However, Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), and Bhagat and Black (1998) find a 
negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and performance. In 
contrast, Krivogorsky (2006) observes significant positive relationship between independent 
directors and the companies’ performance. But one can argue that the bank supervisory 
authorities have made provision for maintaining at least one-tenth independent directors of the 
board keeping an eye on ensuring increased independent supervision of board and bank 
activities and to protect stakeholder interest in the company, not to earn profit. Appointment 
of independent directors does not or should not guarantee an increase in the company’s 
earnings. On this argument and considering mixed and conflicting results of this variable as 
discussed above, the second hypothesis is formulated as: 
 
H2: The proportion of independent directors in the board has no significant relationship with 
corporate performance. 
 
The success of a company mostly depends on the balanced composition of a board consisting 
of inside and outside directors. Some authors argue that boards dominated by non-executive 
directors may help to alleviate the agency problem by monitoring and controlling the 
opportunistic behaviour of management and also by ensuring that managers are not the sole 
evaluators of their own performance (Jensen – Meckling 1976; Baysinger – Hoskisson 1990). 
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It is evident that almost all non-executive directors have multiple shareholdings and 
directorships. So, it is not unjustified to raise the issue that they are busy with so many tasks 
in different places around the clock and have little time to look into specific issues of a 
particular company, other than to have bird’s eyes view. 
 
Empirical evidence on non-executive directors and performance is mixed. Some authors 
found positive relationship between the non-executive directors and the firm’s performance 
(Choi et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2007). In contrast, in the UK, Weir and Laing (1999) found 
insignificant relationship between non-executive director representation and performance. 
However, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Harmalin and Weisbach (1991) find no 
relationship between board composition and performance when both relate to the same year. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) also found no relationship and commented that boards dominated 
by non-executive directors do not seem to affect performance regardless of the measures used. 
So, the third hypothesis of the study is: 
 
H3: No significant relationship exists between the proportion of non-independent non-
executive directors and corporate performance. 
 
To curb agency conflicts and to reduce agency costs, a company may choose three types of 
CEO incentive alignment mechanisms to implement to monitor the CEO – the CEO duality 
mechanism, CEO ownership mechanism, and CEO compensation mechanism. In case of the 
banking sector in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Bank rules and SEC guidelines regarded the 
practice of duality undesirable. Interesting enough that the CEO’s in the banking sector in 
Bangladesh are hardly seen to have possessed shares of the same bank and as a result no 
hypotheses are required to be drawn in respect to CEO duality and ownership. The last usual 
one is the CEO compensation mechanism that implies that a company may pay higher 
remuneration to the managers, especially to the CEO in order to align his interests with 
shareholders interests. This alignment should induce the CEO to take actions that create firm 
value and thus curb agency conflict.   
 
Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) find a significant positive association between cash pay and 
company performance. In contrast, Brick et al. (2006) argues that an excessive level of 
compensation for a CEO provides an indicator of poor corporate governance structure and 
that this is a precursor to the underperformance of firms. Basu et al. (2007) also finds that 
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relative to ownership and monitoring variables, excessive pay levels have a negative 
association with subsequent accounting performance. Similar negative relationship between 
excess director compensation and firm performance is reported by Brick et al. (2006). 
Recently, Duffhues and Kabir (2008) question the conventional wisdom of using executive 
pay to align managers’ interest with those of shareholders after finding no systematic 
evidence that executive pay of Dutch firms is positively related to corporate performance. The 
above mentioned arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is a significant relationship between CEO compensation and corporate 
performance. 
 
Consistent with the agency theory, the audit committee works as an additional control 
mechanism that ensures that the shareholders’ interests are being safeguarded. In keeping 
with the Cadbury proposal, Bangladesh Bank and SEC have made it compulsory for all banks 
to constitute a board’ audit committee consisting of a minimum of three members and it must 
hold at least three meetings in a year. As the constitution of audit committee is mandatory for 
banking companies in Bangladesh, every company has an audit committee in existence but 
there is no way to judge their effectiveness. In this case, the total numbers of meetings held in 
a year have been used as a proxy to internal control mechanisms to judge the effectiveness of 
the committee in this study. However, given the corporate governance guidelines of 
Bangladesh Bank, the hypothesis is drawn as: 
 
 
H5: Number of audit committee meetings has a significant positive relationship with 
corporate performance. 
 
Ownership structure that shows the concentration of ownership by inside shareholders and 
outside shareholders plays a vital role in effective corporate governance. It is argued that 
when firms effectively become controlled by larger shareholders, deviations in the control of 
cash flow rights induce these controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth by seeking 
personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. The existence of controlling 
shareholders thus implies agency costs arising from conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and outside investors (Lemmon – Lins 2003; Chen – Lee 2008). In the banking 
sector of Bangladesh, on average 85 percent of the directors of a company are non-executive-
non-independent directors holding 40.19 percent shares on average in their companies. 
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According to the ‘convergence-to-interest’ model, there is a relationship between directors 
shareholdings and performance because the greater the financial stake, the greater the costs 
for not maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Jensen – Meckling 1976). As the agency costs 
relating to managers are obviously increased to align the managers, the board of directors is 
supposed to maximize their wealth at the expense of creditors / depositors interests. Different 
researchers found ambiguous relationship between board shares and performance. Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) commented that the size of insider ownership does matter and the effect can be 
both positive and negative. The positive relation at low levels of managerial ownership 
suggests incentive alignment while the negative relation at high levels of managerial 
ownership provides evidence that managers become entrenched and can indulge in non-value-
maximizing activities without being disciplined by shareholders (Himmelberg et al. 1999). 
Directors’ shareholdings, directly or indirectly are common in the banking sector in 
Bangladesh. Based on these ambiguous results in the literature, the hypothesis is drawn as:  
 
H6: No significant relationship exists between the proportion of board ownership and 
corporate performance. 
 
Institutional investors generally do have some characteristics that make them unique and 
distinct shareholders. Firstly, institutional investors typically hold shares as part of a portfolio 
investment strategy. A second and related point is that although legally the shares are owned 
by the investment company, economically the ultimate investors and clients are the clients of 
the investor (Jonathan 2007). But institutional investors as external investors cannot influence 
the key decisions about companies’ operation.  
 
Ho (2005) reports that significant share holdings by institutional investors raises board 
vigilance, which in turn has a positive effect on firm performance. On the other hand, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Dhnadirek and Tang (2003) find no significant relationship 
between performance and institutional shareholding. The authors are of the opinion that 
institutional ownership itself cannot be effective to enhance the operating performance. So, 
the hypothesis is: 
 
H7: No significant relationship exists between the proportion of institutional ownership and 
corporate performance. 
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One of the mechanisms in controlling moral hazard problems arising from separation of 
ownership and control is via concentrated ownership by outside shareholders, as they have 
greater incentives to align management and shareholder interests, resulting in better corporate 
performance (Li – Simerly 1998) and benefiting minority shareholders. However, 
concentrated ownership can come with costs for minority shareholders as the controlling 
owners might try to expropriate the company’s assets (Haniffa – Hudaib 2006). Fishman et al. 
(2005) posit that ownership structure depends on the individual characteristics of the 
organization. For this reason, different empirical studies on the association between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance give ambiguous results. Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988), and Leech and Leahy (1991) found a positive relationship between external 
shareholdings and performance. In contrast, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no 
empirical relationship between ownership structure and profitability, and Murali and Welch 
(1989) and Weir et al. (2002) also drew the same conclusion. So, the study considers the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H8: No significant relationship exists between the proportion of general public ownership and 
corporate performance. 
 
Two other variables in determining a company’s performance, leverage (in terms of debt-
equity ratio), and size (proxied by total assets) are considered in this study as control 
variables. Like other variables, relationship of the gearing ratio with performance shows 
conflicting results in different studies. Short and Keasey (1999) and Weir et al. (2002) found a 
significant negative relationship between gearing and corporate performance. This study 
draws the hypothesis that: 
 
H9: No significant relationship exists between debt-equity ratio and corporate performance. 
 
The size of the company has been shown to have a relationship with other factors. The 
literature is in harmony with this tendency. Company size may be measured in different ways 
such as sales turnover, total assets, capital employed, etc. Actually, to measure the magnitude 
of a company, total assets is such a determinant that may preferably be used than other 
measures because sometimes a medium firm may have larger sales volume, for example, due 
to increase in assets turnover. Hence, the next hypothesis is: 
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H10: There exists a significant relationship between company size and corporate performance. 
 
5. Methodology and Variables 
The sample companies used in this study are banking companies listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh. As of December 31, 2009, a total of 27 banking companies 
were listed on the main board of the DSE. Excluding two banking companies – one for being 
listed at the end of 2007 and another for data missing, a sample of 25 banking companies is 
used in this study. The study is conducted on six years of data from 2003 to 2008. The study 
primarily collected data from the published annual reports of the company. In the following 
we provide a brief description of dependent and independent variables and the models used 
for this study to test hypotheses. 
 
Dependent Variables: The dependent variable is corporate performance and three 
measurements, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q are taken into 
account as proxies as accounting-based measures of performance and market-based measures 
of performance.  
 
Independent Variables: The explanatory variables used in this study are board size, share of 
independent directors, share of non-independent non-executive director, ownership of 
directors, institutional ownership, general public ownership, CEO remuneration, and the 
number of audit committee meetings. Control variables are leverage and company size.  
 
The Model: To test the hypotheses discussed above, the study used Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) multiple regression to examine the relationship of corporate governance variables and 
corporate performance. 
 
ROAt / ROEt / TOBQt = α0 +β1BSIZE+ β2 INDD + β3NINED + β4SDOWN+ β5INOWN + 
β6GPOWN + β7CEORM + β8AUDCM + β9TASSETS+ β10DERATIO + ε     (1) 
 
Where 
α0 constant; 
ROA rate of return on total assets; 
ROE  rate of return on equity; 
TOBQ      Tobin’s Q; 
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BSIZE board size (log); 
INDD  proportion of independent director; 
NINED     proportion of non-independent non-executive director; 
SDOWN share of sponsor/director ownership; 
INOWN   share of institutional ownership; 
GPOWN  share of general public ownership; 
CEORM   CEO remuneration (log); 
AUDCM number of audit committee meetings (log); 
TASSETS  total assets (log); 
DERATIO debt-equity ratio (log). 
ε error term. 
 
‘Given the perspective nature of the Code of Best Practice, it could be argued that the internal 
governance mechanisms are exogenous rather than endogenous. Using OLS would therefore 
be appropriate’ (Weir et al. 2002). However, it is often argued that is similar cases ‘OLS 
yields inconsistent results as OLS parameter estimates are biased’ (Rose 2005) and 
endogeneity creates a problem in corporate governance research and researchers do not often 
consider this issue with reasonable care. Considering the potential endogeneity, another 
model is also tested to gain further insights into the relationship. The model is constructed 
such that year t’s performance is dependent on year t-1’s governance structure and as such a 
lagged dependent variable is introduced in the right-hand side of the respective model (as 
constructed by Klein 1998; Weir et al. 2002; Haniffa – Hudaib 2006; and Brick et al. 2006). 
The model is: 
 
ROAt / ROEt / TOBQt= α0 +β1BSIZE+ β2 INDD + β3NINED + β4SDOWN+ β5INOWN + β6GPOWN + 
β7CEORM + β8AUDCM + β9TASSETS+ β10DERATIO + β11LAG + ε    (2)   
 
Where, 
LAG is ROAt-1, or ROEt-1, or TOBQt-1 i.e. ROA, ROE, and TOBQ lagged one year. 
 
Multiple regression for each model are conducted for the pooled data for all six years. 
 
6. Findings 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 1 presents the overall descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Label N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return on assets (%) ROA 130 2.60 1.60 0.000 17.2 
Return on equity (%) ROE 130 18.60 7.40 15.00 42.20 
Tobin’s Q TOBQ 125 1.11 0.24 0.120 2.326 
Board size (No.) BSIZE 132 13.48 4.10 6.00 27.00 
Independent directors (%) INDD 132 0.18 0.04 0.000 1.43 
Non-independent non-executive  
directors (%) 
NINED 132 89.20 0.06 70.00 96.00 
Director’s ownership (%) SDOWN 130 40.19 24.17 0.00 96.15 
Institutional ownership (%) INOWN 130 9.78 9.60 0.00 42.24 
General public ownership (%) GPOWN 130 42.58 25.26 0.00 95.85 
Number of audit committee meetings 
(No.) 
AUDCM 105 7.97 10.34 0.00 73.00 
CEO remuneration (Mln. Tk.) CEORM 138 4.23 2.10 2.83 11.30 
Total Assets (Mln. Tk.) TASSETS 134 42639 32020 3970 230879 
Debt-Equity Ratio (Times) DERATIO 130 15.21 4.64 7.06 28.73 
Source: authors 
 
In respect of dependent variables, it can be seen that the mean value for the rate of return on 
shareholders’ equity, on average is 18.60 percent, ranging from 15.00 percent to 42.20 
percent, implying over-performance in investments. As for the independent variables, the 
table shows that the average board size is 13.48, which is more or less within the size as 
recommended by Bangladesh Bank but still the number is high in at least 25 percent of 
companies. Proportion of independent directors shows appalling result, there are some 
companies where there is not even a single independent director in the board. It implies non-
compliance with SEC rules. In terms of board composition, the mean percentage of non-
independent non-executive directors in the board is 89.20 percent which implies that the 
board is composed of mainly non-independent outside directors. It is said that the directors 
are businessmen having directorships in at least 5 other multi-faceted companies. In respect of 
ownership, the average percentage of shareholdings by the board of directors is 40.19 
indicating concentrated ownership and quite strong voting power of the directors. The mean 
value of institutional ownership (9.78%) indicates poor holdings suggesting negligible voting 
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power in selecting directors in the board. The average percentage of general public ownership 
is 42.58 and standard deviation is 25.26, indicating defuse ownership patterns among the 
general public who hold lesser proportion of ownership in most of the companies.  
 
The average amount of CEO compensation per year shows that most of the companies pay 
Tk. 4.23 million while the maximum is 11.30 million indicating a very wide variation. The 
mean for debt-equity ratio is 15.21, indicating that the investment of depositors creditors in 
the banking business is on an average 15.21 times as much as the investment of the 
shareholders. It becomes salient that the average rate of interest on deposits (7.5 percent) in 
the bank and yearly rate of inflation are more or less equal in the country. The directors are 
prominently non-independent outside businessmen having concentrated ownership in the 
bank. CEOs are highly paid professionals without position-duality and ownership interests. 
The shareholders are getting an average yearly return at the rate of 18.60 percent on their 
investment having been the owners of only one-fifteenth in the total assets invested in the 
banks. The situation leads one to comment that banking business is such an attractive low-risk 
business that pays off.  
 
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. 
One of the suggested rules of thumb for a multicollinearity test is that if the pair-wise or zero-
order correlation coefficient between two regressors is high, say, in excess of 0.80, then 
multicollinearity is a serious problem (Gujarati 2004). The estimated pair-wise correlation 
coefficient is less than 0.70 in all cases and thus the estimated results are not likely to be 
affected by the multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 ROA ROE TOBQ BSIZE INDD NINED SDOWN INOWN GPOWN AUDCM CEORM TASSETS 
ROA 1                       
ROE 0.31* 1                     
TOBQ 0.42* 0.14 1                   
BSIZE 0.02 -0.09 0.17 1                 
INDD 0.05 0.11 0.17 -0.25* 1               
NINED 0.01 -0.09 -0.10 0.48* -0.73* 1             
SDOWN -0.18* 0.05 0.10 0.21* -0.25* 0.25* 1           
INOWN 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.10 0.10 1         
GPOWN 0.21* -0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.25* -0.15 -0.68* -0.26* 1       
17 
 
AUDCM -0.12 -0.01 0.11 0.18 -0.10 0.24* 0.07 -0.33* -0.01 1     
CEORM 0.04 0.14 0.37* -0.02 0.38* -0.31* 0.14 0.18* 0.08 -0.09 1   
TASSETS -0.28* 0.04 0.14 -0.17 0.23* -0.26* -0.09 -0.06 0.07 0.43* 0.33* 1 
 DERATIO -0.32* -0.26* 0.04 -0.13 -0.17 0.024 0.05 -0.26* -0.04 0.14 -0.11 0.09 
* indicates 5% level of significance 
source: authors 
 
6.2. Regression Analysis 
 
The regression analysis attempts to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the companies’ performance based on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. The 
results from the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. with six separate regressions, 
two of each under each performance measure. The F-statistics of the regression models are 
statistically significant at less than one percent level implying goodness-of-fit of the 
regression equations. The R squared values range from 0.32 to 0.41 excepting one (.13) 
indicate that the models are capable of explaining variability ranging from 32 percent to 41 
percent in the performance of the companies. 
 
Table 3. Regressions of company performance variables on corporate governance 
mechanisms 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Return on Assets  
(ROA)  
Return on Equity  
(ROE) 
Tobin's Q  
(TOBQ) 
 Model-1 
Pooled OLS 
Model-2 
Pooled OLS 
Model-1 
Pooled OLS 
Model-2 
Pooled OLS 
Model-1 
Pooled OLS 
Model-2 
Pooled OLS 
LAG   -0.08(-0.80) 
[0.42] 
 0.58
***
(5.56) 
[0.00] 
 -0.16(-1.12) 
[0.26] 
BSIZE -0.01(-1.47) 
[0.14 
-0.01
*
(-1.77) 
[0.08] 
-0.03(-0.89) 
[0.37] 
-0.02(-0.66) 
[0.51] 
0.04(0.30) 
[0.77] 
0.08(0.51) 
[0.61] 
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INDD -0.02 (-0.45) 
[0.65] 
-0.02(-0.25) 
[0.80] 
0.06(0.17) 
[0.86] 
0.12(0.39) 
[0.69] 
-0.09(-0.08) 
[0.94] 
0.07(0.06) 
[0.95] 
NINED 0.01(0.51) 
[0.61] 
0.03(1.01) 
[0.31] 
-0.01(-0.03) 
[0.97] 
-0.10(-0.43) 
[0.67] 
-0.12(-0.10) 
[0.92] 
-0.03(-0.03) 
[0.98] 
SDOWN -0.01(-1.10) 
[0.27] 
-0.01(-0.81) 
[0.42] 
-0.02(-0.28) 
[0.78] 
0.05(1.26) 
[0.21] 
0.13(1.10) 
[0.27] 
0.13(0.78) 
[0.44] 
INOWN -0.0004(-0.03) 
[0.98] 
-0.001(-0.08) 
[0.93] 
-0.12(-1.06) 
[0.29] 
-0.12(-1.34) 
[0.18] 
-0.29(-1.26) 
[0.21] 
-0.45(-1.48) 
[0.14] 
GPOWN 0.02(1.35) 
[0.18] 
0.02
*
(1.95) 
[0.052] 
-0.02(-0.33) 
[0.74] 
0.06
*
(1.95) 
[0.051] 
0.20(1.56) 
[0.12] 
0.20(1.26) 
[0.21] 
AUDCM 0.005
*
(1.66) 
[0.09] 
0.003(0.77) 
[0.44] 
0.01(0.48) 
[0.63] 
-0.01(-0.94) 
[0.35] 
0.01(0.46) 
[0.65] 
-0.01(-0.14) 
[0.89] 
CEORM 0.002(0.65) 
[0.52] 
0.002(0.38) 
[0.70] 
-0.01(-0.44) 
[0.66] 
-0.02(-1.08) 
[0.28] 
-0.03(-0.48) 
[0.63] 
-0.06(-0.76) 
[0.45] 
TASSETS -0.02
*
(-1.75) 
[0.08] 
-0.02(-1.59) 
[0.11] 
0.0003(0.01) 
[0.99] 
0.01(0.53) 
[0.60] 
-0.05(-0.53) 
[0.60] 
-0.05(-0.40) 
[0.69] 
DERATIO -0.004(-0.27) 
[0.79] 
-0.002(-0.17) 
[0.87] 
-0.07
**
(-2.17) 
[0.03] 
-0.02(-0.83) 
[0.41] 
0.13(1.19) 
[0.24] 
0.22(1.60) 
[0.11] 
Constant 0.28
**
(2.28) 
[0.02] 
0.23(1.63) 
[0.103] 
0.65(1.24) 
[0.22] 
0.53(1.17) 
[0.24] 
1.70(1.18) 
[0.24] 
1.94(0.88) 
[0.38] 
No. of Obs. 100 79 100 79 94 74 
Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 0.40 0.41 0.13 0.43 0.32 0.32 
F-Test  
(p-value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T-statistics in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Source: authors 
 
The table shows that the results are largely consistent across all the models. Though the beta 
coefficient of the board size variable confirms to the expected inverse relationship with ROA 
and ROE as hypothesized before, the variable is found to be significant at 10 percent level of 
confidence while performance is measured only by ROA. The board size also shows no 
relationship with market performance. The inverse relation and the lack of relation 
respectively support the findings of Yermack (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (2000), who 
suggest that the market perceives larger boards as ineffective as they tend to be symbolic 
rather than being part of the actual management process (Haniffa – Hudaib 2006). Neither of 
19 
 
the board composition variables (INDD and NINED) turned out to be significant in any of the 
models, hence hypotheses 2 and 3 are accepted. The results support the findings of Hermalin 
– Weisbach (2000), Weir et al. (2002) and (Haniffa – Hudaib 2006). The coefficient of CEO 
compensation variable is negative and insignificant in both the market measure and 
accounting measure (ROE) of performance, thereby rejecting hypothesis 4. The result is in 
keeping with the findings of Basu et al. (2007) who posits that relative to ownership and 
monitoring variables, excessive pay levels have a negative association with subsequent 
accounting performance. The audit committee variable (AUDCM) is found to have a 
significant relationship with accounting performance at a 10 percent level in model 1, so there 
is only weak support for hypothesis 5. The result supports the study conducted by Ho (2005). 
 
Among the ownership structure variables, the extent of influence of directors’ ownership 
(SDOWN) and institutional ownership (INOWN) on performance in both the models are 
varied and in most of the cases negative but none of them turns to be significant, and thus we 
can accepting hypotheses 6 and 7. In contrast, the general public ownership (GPOWN) 
variable turns up not only with a positive impact but is also significant at the 10 percent 
confidence level in model 2 in the accounting measure of performance, which rejects 
hypothesis 8. The results of SDOWN and INOWN in this study largely support the findings 
of Lehmann and Weigand (2000), and Weir et al. (2002) and GPOWN conforms to the 
findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). The coefficient of the control variable ‘DERATIO’ is 
not only negative in almost all the models but also significant at the 5 percent level in case of 
accounting measures of performance, which partially rejects hypothesis 9. The negative 
coefficient supports the findings of Weir et al. (2002), Haniffa – Hudaib (2006). The other 
control variable, company size (TASSETS), does not turn up to be significant other than in 
model 1 with the accounting measure (ROA) of performance and hence rejects hypothesis 10. 
The negative coefficients and significance supports the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006). 
 
6.3. Test of the Regression Model 
The test of muticollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and auto-correlation was performed with the 
help of the statistical package used to analyze the data. In addition to using the correlation 
coefficient matrix, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance (TOL) have been used as a 
measures of multicollinearity. Table 4 shows that the estimated VIF (TOL) is far lower 
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(higher) than the threshold level (10 for VIF, 0 for TOL) and thus the estimated results are 
less likely to be affected by multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 4. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) & Tolerance (TOL) 
 BSIZE INDD NINED SDOWN INOWN GPOWN AUDCM CEORM TASSETS DERATIO Mean 
VIF 1.42 2.59 2.99 2.82 1.49 2.93 1.84 1.82 1.94 1.25 2.11 
TOL 0.707 0.386 0.334 0.354 0.673 0.341 0.542 0.549 0.514 0.798 0.52 
Source: authors 
 
In order to check whether there is any heteroskedasticity in the regression, White’s general 
heteroskedasticity test has been applied where the null hypothesis is that there is no 
heteroskedasticity. All the regression models show that the calculated chi-square value does 
not exceed the critical chi-square and thus the null hypothesis is not rejected. In addition, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted robust standard errors were used in the 
estimation. 
 
Conclusions 
The study reports the results of the extent of compliance with the statutory norms and 
guidelines relating to corporate governance mechanisms and the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed banking companies in 
Bangladesh. Because of possessing unique characteristics, banks are to work under close 
monitoring and the direct regulatory and supervisory policies promulgated by the central bank 
to protect the interest of shareholders as well as the depositors.  
 
It is found that a good number of companies do not comply with the mandatory requirements 
for board size, appointment of independent directors in the board, and holding audit 
committee meetings set forth by the central bank and the SEC indicating a remarkable 
shortfall in corporate governance practice. The board is seen to have been prevalently 
dominated by outside non-independent directors having multiple directorships and the 
companies are actually run by professional managers having no duality and no ownership 
interest for which they have been compensated by much remuneration to curb agency conflict. 
The rate of return on shareholders’ equity is constantly high. Apart from some inconsistent 
relationship of some governance variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not 
appear to have a significant relationship with financial performances. Irrespective of the 
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models and the measures of performance, insignificant negative impact or somewhere no 
impact of independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors on the level of 
performance strongly support the concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust 
and earn returns for the owners. The concept is called the stewardship theory which assumes 
that a steward protects and maximizes shareholders wealth through firm performance, 
because, by so doing the steward’s utility functions are maximized (Davis et al. 1997). The 
results support findings of a large volume of literature. The results contend that corporate 
governance ensures conformance but does not directly ensure performance, rather helps to 
achieve the desired performance of an organization. Good corporate governance with the goal 
of adopting strategic decision and risk management by efficient utilization of the 
organization’s resources can achieve performance. 
 
The study is not fully free from flaws. It suffers from some limitations that pave the way for 
further avenue of research in this area. Firstly, the study used an OLS regression model. We 
also used a fixed-effects estimators in addition to the OLS with lagged variables as suggested 
by Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Black and Kim (2008), which has not been reported because 
results did not differ from the OLS version. Further studies may test the link by using 2SLS or 
3SLS estimators or System GMM. Secondly, as stated earlier there is few research in the area 
of governance structure and performance in the banking sector, so the results have been 
compared to the findings of other research in the non-financial sectors. In this case, the study 
may be considered as a pointer in this area in Bangladesh. Thirdly, only nine corporate 
governance variables have been considered in this study. Hence, there remains further scope 
for adding new variables such as effectiveness of board executive committees, performance of 
audit committees, multiple directorships of board members, directors incentives, and the 
threat of take-over. Finally, assessment of this complex topic has been studied from a rather 
narrow empirical perspective only based on information disclosed in the annual reports. The 
study could be enhanced further with questionnaires interviewing those involved in 
governance structure in the company and in the overseeing regulatory body of the company. 
 
This study makes several contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance. There 
are few studies regarding corporate governance mechanisms and companies’ performance in 
developing countries. Very few such studies can be found in the context of the financial sector 
in Bangladesh. From this perspective, the study has immense value to the planners and 
regulators and will provide additional support for the view that while much emphasis on 
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corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of stakeholders, 
corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate conformance 
cannot make a company successful. A company needs to balance corporate governance 
mechanisms (conformance) with performance by adopting strategic decisions and risk 
management with the efficient utilization of the organization’s resources. 
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